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AMERICAN SAMOA
Elections, continuing financial crises,
department director rejections and res-
ignations, and investigations of white
collar crime were some of the high-
lights in the territory in 1992-93.
In the November 1992 elections for
governor, the two dominant figures in
American Samoan politics for the past
fifteen years, Peter Coleman and A. P.
Lutali, once again faced off in what
proved to be a clear victory for Lutali.
He and his lieutenant governor, Tauese
Sunia, garnered 53.2 percent of the vote
compared to 36.5 percent for Coleman
and his running mate, Senator Letuli
Toloa. This represented a substantial
voter switch from the 1988 election.
Candidates Pili and Pritchard placed
third and last, respectively. Their
slightly more than 10 percent of the
vote was disappointing, given their
new economic ideas and calls for resto-
ration of morality and personal respon-
sibility in government. In the congres-
sional ballot, incumbent Faleomavaega
Eni Hunkin overwhelmed the opposi-
tion with 64.4 percent of the vote com-
pared to 18.3 percent for second place
finisher Tautai Aviata Fa'alevao.
Though assurances were given of a
smooth transition, the governor-elect
and his transition team faced some
questionable tactics on the part of the
outgoing Coleman administration.
Several of these were publicly perceived
as deliberate attempts to make matters
as difficult as possible for the new
administration. An advance payment
of US$44,000 was made to the Wash-
ington office run by Coleman's son-in-
law a few weeks after the election,
while numerous violations of the 1989
executive order freezing new hiring,
salary increases, and increments were
reported. Governor-elect Lutali ex-
pressed little surprise at the actions of
his opponents, and declared his inten-
tion of closing the Washington office
because it was "a waste of tax-payer's
money" (Samoa News, 23 Nov 1992).
In the past, the Coleman administra-
tion had contended that the consulting
services Lutali relied on in Washington,
DC were more costly and less effective
than those provided by Coleman's son-
in-law.
When Lutali served in the senate, he
was accused of political obstruction by
the administration. He now has to
cope with the same potential problem.
As anticipated, the new administration
encountered stern opposition from
some quarters of the fana, particularly
the senate. Lutali lost two battles over
his nominations of department direc-
tors. Salu Hunkin, younger sister of
Congressman Hunkin and nominee
for director of education, was twice
rejected by the senate, with former
house speaker Tuana'itau Tuia leading
the opposition. Hunkin's selection, and
subsequent rejection by the senate,
generated a spate of letters in the local
press, both in her support and oppos-
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ing her. Congressman Hunkin accused
the former speaker of sabotaging the
nomination as a personal vendetta
against himself. The two politicians
have had several publicized disputes
during the past few years, and al-
though Tuia denies any personal rea-
sons for his no vote, many public sup-
porters of Salu Hunkin feel that her
qualifications for the directorship far
outweigh the contentions of her oppo-
nents. She has recently been appointed
deputy director of education. The
other twice-rejected nominee was act-
ing hospital director, Tagoa'i Matt
Tunoa.
Two embarrassing mishaps con-
cerning directors tainted the Lutali
administration in 1993. In early May,
commissioner of public safety Victor
Liu, who had been approved by the
fono, was indicted for the alleged
embezzlement of U5$22,000 from the
Los Angeles police department from
which he had recently retired. Gover-
nor Lutali was compelled to request
his resignation, although Liu claimed
innocence. The governor's own son,
Julius Lutali, was named as acting
commissioner. A second director, also
confirmed by the fono, American
Samoa Development Bank President
Fanuaea Gurr, was fired by the gover-
nor on 16 June. Her removal followed
the recommendation of the develop-
ment bank board, which uncovered
discrepancies and mismanagement
activities involving the president and
two other employees.
In line with his campaign pledge to
combat corruption, waste, and abuse
in government, the governor initiated
a course of action that included estab-
lishment of a white collar crime task
force and federal audits of government
operations. Task force investigations
of the Territorial Administration on
Aging led to an arrest warrant being
issued for the former director and his
secretary. Fourteen criminal charges
have been filed against the two sus-
pects, including the "forging and cash-
ing of senior citizens' food vouchers
worth thousands of dollars" (Samoa
News, 2 July 93). Although investiga-
tions of alleged criminal activity at the
Territorial Administration on Aging
were initiated by the Department of
Public Safety in 1992, pressure from
former governor Coleman's office cur-
tailed their continuation. Other gov-
ernment departments under task force
scrutiny at the end of the review period
included Public Works, Parks and
Recreation, and the Office of Motor
Vehicles.
American Samoa's financial woes
continued with no end in sight. The
new administration took over a trea-
sury emptied of reserves, and the reper-
cussions were felt throughout the com-
munity. In the second week of January,
Lutali's revenue task force recom-
mended the layoff of over four hundred
unbudgeted employees as a first step in
addressing the deficit. This prompted
an immediate public backlash from
affected families and opponents in the
fono. The first phase of Operation
Reduction in Force will save an esti-
mated U5$3 ni.illion annually, or 3 per-
cent of the government's U5$100 mil-
lion annual personnel expenditures.
Phase two of the operation began in
March with the reversal of all salary
increases, promotions and new hires
made after 1990, when the Coleman
"freeze" was to have become effective.
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In addition, a 35-hour work week went
into effect for all government employ-
ees of the executive division, except
teachers and hospital employees. The
initiative was discussed heatedly in the
senate, with claims that the fana was
ignored and denied opportunity to con-
sult with administration officials about
possible alternatives.
Auditors of the Inspector General's
Office reported the government deficit
to be us$60 million, which meant local
vendors were unable to collect on the
reported us$8 million owed them by
the government. The Health Depart-
ment owed more that us$500,000 to
off-island medical suppliers, resulting
in frequent critical shortages of basic
hospital supplies and medicines. Many
taxpayers awaited tax refunds, about
half of which have not been returned as
the government shuffles scarce reve-
nues to meet payroll and other out-
standing debts.
Governor Lutali called a twenty-day
special session of the legislature in late
May to promote swift action on his
revenue proposals. The proposed
excise tax bill is the centerpiece of the
revenue package, which calls for in-
creased taxes on gasoline, commercial
imports, heavy machinery, vehicles,
liquor, and soda. The administration
projected that US$1O million would be
raised. However, the house passed its
own version of an amended excise tax,
while the senate continued to seek
alternatives other than raising taxes.
The special session concluded on 14
June with no final action taken.
The Lutali-Tauese administration
assumed the reigns of government with
the unenviable task of rectifying a
decade's worth of freewheeling, unac-
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countable government spending and
mismanagement. If they succeed, even
in part, in restoring financial stability
and credibility in the way the govern-
ment of American Samoa conducts its
operations, it will be a significant
accomplishment.
BILL LEGALLEY
FRENCH POLYNESIA
French neocolonialism in the Pacific,
and the nuclear testing program in par-
ticular, has been much criticized by
neighboring governments, but has
encountered minimal opposition in
Tahiti. Decades of reliance on expendi-
tures by the CEP (Centre d'Experimen-
tation du Pacifique) have persuaded
islanders and resident expatriates alike
that the nuclear testing program is vital
to Tahiti's economic survival. Not sur-
prisingly, France's decision to suspend
nuclear testing in April 1992 was
received with concern in Tahiti. The
political fallout was felt intensely by
the recently elected government of Gas-
ton Flosse, already struggling for sur-
vival amidst huge budget deficits, cor-
ruption scandals, and abysmally low
public confidence.
President Flosse claimed that the
immediate halt of CEP activities would
be economically and socially "cata-
strophic." He warned of an impending
layoff of 5200 employees; a loss of 5000
business and government jobs indi-
rectly related to the CEP; a shortfall of
US$45 million in the territorial budget;
and losses of us$600 million in reve-
nues for the local economy (an esti-
mated 22 percent decline). The suspen-
sion of nuclear testing was welcomed,
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however, by the increasingly popular
Oscar Temaru, leader of the pro-inde-
pendence and antinuclear Tavini
Huiraatira Party. Temaru also called
for complete independence from
France, and staged a public demonstra-
tion in Pape'ete, supported by (strange
bedfellows) Boris Leontieff and Emile
Vernaudon.
Worried that the testing program
was coming to an abrupt end, Plosse
dispatched a government delegation to
France, demanding a cancellation of
territorial debts, financial compensa-
tion for projected losses of jobs and
local revenues, infrastructure develop-
ment, and assistance in attracting over-
seas economic investment. In Paris, the
delegation was assured that the tests
had only been temporarily suspended
for the remainder of the year; they
would tentatively resume some time in
.the following year. The delegation was
also promised a small amount of finan-
cial assistance for 1992. In addition, an
ambitious and far reaching "Pact of
Progress" between France and Tahiti
was proposed.
The proposed Pact of Progress was
to ensure collaborative effort on a
long-term plan to address the territo-
ry's economic problems. Generous
financial support would be provided by
France, providing that France and
Tahiti could agree on a realistic plan to
shape Tahiti's economic, social, and
cultural development for the following
decade. The Tahitian economy was to
be restructured, enabling a drop in the
dependence rate on French expendi-
tures from 75 percent to 55 percent by
the year 20°3. The man designated to
develop the territorial proposal was
Christian Vernaudon, chief executive
officer of Air Tahiti, the territory's
largest and most successful private
business.
In January, a delegation was dis-
patched to Paris with a completed pro-
posal. The necessary economic restruc-
turing was to be accomplished through
expenditure of US$2. 7 billion over the
next ten years. Of this, US$2 billion
was to go for the construction of roads,
ports, airports, environmental facili-
ties, water treatment and distribution,
fuel storage depots, urban and mari-
time transportation, telecommunica-
tions, schools, hospitals, clinics, and
sports facilities. The remainder would
go for employment, research, social
welfare, public health, and culture.
France would be asked to contribute
about US$I billion annually between
1993 and 1997, and us$800 million
over the following five years. The rest
of the financing was to be provided by
the European Community and local
territorial expenditures.
The delegation returned from
France with a provisional agreement
based on a US$3.2 billion spending pro-
gram between 1993 and 2003. The
jointly negotiated plan focussed on
fourteen sectors, including infrastruc-
ture, development of the urban center
and outer islands, employment and job
training, social security, public health,
education, telecommunications, family
planning, and justice. An important
political aspect of the pact was (for the
first time) an explicit admission by
France of its responsibility for the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural upheavals
resulting from the CEP. However, while
a small amount of funding was under-
written by France for 1992, no agree-
ment was reached on the long-term
financing of the pact.
The sticky point was that France
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was unwilling to provide financial sup-
port of the pact without real evidence
that the territory itself was willing to
assume some degree of fiscal responsi-
bility. The Pape'ete government, strug-
gling with a heavily dependent econ-
omy and mounting budget deficits,
seemed unlikely to be able to make the
necessary contribution and the negotia-
tions appeared doomed to failure. A
breakthrough came in June 1993 when,
for the first time in Tahiti's history, an
income tax was instituted, called the
Contribution for Social Solidarity. The
tax was relatively modest and would be
graduated by income. Those earning
US$I,500 per month would pay 0.5 per-
cent; those earning the highest monthly
salaries (US$15,000 or more) would pay
3.9 percent.
The pressure to institute the income
tax came from France, which consid-
ered it an essential condition for
Tahiti's contribution to the Pact of
Progress. During previous election
campaigns, Flosse had repeatedly gone
on record as being absolutely opposed
to an income tax. How then to proceed
without losing face? Flosse's solution
was regarded as a strategic master
stroke in Tahiti. He called for a mara-
thon meeting with local labor unions.
During the negotiations, he reminded
labor leaders of the problems Tahiti
was facing, and asked for suggestions.
After a long silence, Hiro Tefaarere,
head of A Tia i Mua, suggested an
income tax, upon which Flosse replied,
"D'accord!"
Local observers cautioned that the
income tax in itself would not solve
Tahiti's substantial economic prob-
lems. Even if the announced income
tax rate was substantially increased,
tourism was stagnating, the pearl
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industry faced international competi-
tion, and the artificially high cost of
government was not likely to be offset
without politically dangerous reduc-
tions of government salaries. It was
also unclear if employees of the French
state government could be taxed
locally. Unanswered questions not-
withstanding, Michel Jau, the recently
appointed French High Commissioner,
was reported to be quite happy with
the new developments and confident
that the Pact of Progress would soon
become a reality and a long term solu~
tion to Tahiti's problems.
MOSHE RAPAPORT
Sources consulted for this report include
recent issues of La Depeche de Tahiti,
Tahiti Pacifique, and Tahiti Sun Press.
HAWAIIAN ISSUES
In 1993, the centenary of the overthrow
of the Hawaiian government by a gang
of haole (white) businessmen and US
marines, the biggest story was native
sovereignty.
After more than twenty years of
political organizing, native Hawaiian
nationalists finally succeeded in forcing
the issue of self-determination upon a
resisting State of Hawai'i Democratic
Party machine and an ignorant, often
racist, public. The issues are simple:
Hawaiians, who compose 20 percent
of the resident population of the state,
demand recognition as a native people
with human rights claims to sover-
eignty, including self-government; they
claim restitution from the US govern-
ment for the taking of Hawaiian
domain and dominion in 1893, and for
their subsequent forcible incorporation
into the United States in 1898. Such res-
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titution should include all the lands
presently set aside by the US govern-
ment (nearly 1.5 million acres) for the
use of Hawaiians, but not currently
under native control; monies rendered
in restitution for the original injury of
the overthrow and annexation; and
basic civil rights, including access to
state and federal courts.
The two major and opposing groups
engaged in these demands have been a
state-created agency, the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), and a native
initiative for self-government, Ka
Lahui Hawai'i.
OHA'S position has been consistent
since its creation in 1978. No lands are
to be transferred to the Hawaiian peo-
ple; the Hawaiian people are not to be
allowed litigation rights; and no group
apart from OHA is to represent the
Hawaiian people. Only money in the
form of a one-time cash payment from
the state to the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs is supported. Finally, any rela-
tionship of the Hawaiian people to the
federal government is to be established
through the Office of Hawaiian Af-
fairs, allegedly the only official native
organization.
OHA'S position is problematic on
several fronts. Despite its vociferous
claims to speak for the national inter-
ests of the Hawaiian people, OHA has
always represented the state of
Hawai'i. This is hardly surprising since
the organization is an official state
agency whose political position ad-
heres to that of the state Democratic
Party.
In terms of its track record, OHA has
already concluded an agreement with
the state to settle for money rather than
land regarding native lands held in
trust by the state. Simply put, this
means not one acre of native land will
go to the native people, many of whom
are homeless. The state will continue
to control the lands while a pittance
will be paid into OHA coffers. Further-
more, OHA does not define or defend
native sovereignty, preferring instead
to maintain its parental ties to the state
of Hawai'i.
Meanwhile, Ka Lahui Hawai'i has
defined sovereignty as the "ability of a
people who share a common culture,
religion, language, value system and
land base, to exercise control over their
lands and lives, independent of other
nations." In political terms, Ka Lahui
argues that Hawaiians should be iden-
tified as native people (rather than
merely individual citizens) with rights
of inclusion in the US Federal policy on
self-determination for native peoples.
They would enjoy a "nation-to-nation"
relationship with the American govern-
ment. Such nation status would estab-
lish claims to self-government on an
identifiable land base. With this status,
Hawaiians would no longer be wards
of the state and federal governments.
The state of Hawai'i would not be our
"parent" but a co-equal in a three-way
relationship between the Hawaiian
nation, the federal government, and
the state of Hawai'i.
As public consciousness and support
for this form of Hawaiian sovereignty
increased steadily throughout 1992, it
was obvious that Ka Lahui Hawai'i
had out-organized OHA at the commu-
nity level. Calling for a large public
march on 17 January 1993 to commem-
orate the overthrow of the Hawaiian
government and to demand sover-
eignty, Ka Lahui forced the issue of
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land and government for the native
people onto a very public platform.
When fifteen thousand people peace-
fully demonstrated their support for
sovereignty on the centennial day, OHA
suddenly endorsed the concept of a
"nation within a nation." Feeling over-
shadowed by Ka Lahui, whose enroll-
ment of citizens had soared to 15,000,
OHA suddenly began speaking about
"nationhood."
Sensing that the Democratic Party
and OHA were losing control of the tide
of public opinion, Governor Waihe'e
and the OHA trustees teamed up with
state politicians to submit a bill to the
Hawai'i legislature calling for a state-
controlled sovereignty constitutional
convention (Con-Con). Praised by
local media as a victory for Hawaiian
self-determination, the bill actually
placed the entire process in the hands
of the governor, who is empowered to
appoint nineteen sovereignty-commis-
sion members to determine all proce-
dures for the Con-Con.
Since the bill created an undemo-
cratic, top-down structure in which all
authority rests with the state, Ka Lahui
Hawai'i and other sovereignty groups
opposed it. Despite what the native
people wanted, the bill passed into law
and the governor selected commission
members in August 1993.
While the state moved to foreclose
native self-determination, international
organizing by Hawaiians continued.
Ka Lahui joined with other indepen-
dence groups to host an international
tribunal in Hawai'i to bring charges of
human rights violations against the
United States. Experts on international
law, including lawyers and scholars,
aided Hawaiians in drafting submis-
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sions to international forums to regis-
ter human rights complaints against
the United States.
Meanwhile, Hawaiian sovereignty
leaders traveled to Vienna and Geneva
to attend human rights conferences to
present the case for self-determination.
Finally, Ka Lahui continued to inform
the public about the latest Democratic
Party efforts to short-circuit Hawaiian
self-determination. Despite a racist
press and massive state opposition to
real native autonomy, critical Hawai-
ian voices were heard, if not heeded.
It is a supreme irony that after
nearly two decades of organizing for
self-government, the drive for Hawai-
ian sovereignty should have been
stunted by a Hawaiian governor,
Hawaiian legislators, and an all-native
Office of Hawaiian Affairs. At this
stage in our history, sell-out Hawaiians
are everywhere. As if taking their cues
from "government" Indians in the con-
tinental United States, Americanized
Hawaiians have begun to sing the song
of collaboration. In a year's time,
Hawaiians will be faced with yet an-
other obstacle to self-determination: a
state-called constitutional convention.
HAUNANI-KAY TRASK
MAORI ISSUES
The most momentous political event
for Maori in 1992 was the signing of
the Sealords deal in September between
the Crown and Maori leaders. The
Maori Fisheries Act 1989, which estab-
lished the Maori Fisheries Commis-
sion, and returned 10 percent of the
fishing quota to Maori, was only a par-
tial settlement of the Maori fisheries
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claim to 50 percent of the quota. The
battle for the remaining 40 percent
continued out of public view.
In a memorandum to the Cabinet
Strategy Committee, minister of justice
Douglas Graham recommended a
change of approach in dealing with
Maori treaty claims (New Zealand
1992,11-15). Previous governments
were unwilling to concede that
breaches of the Treaty ofWaitangi had
occurred. This saw the Crown losing a
succession of ten major court cases.
With the inclusion of treaty clauses, or
references to the treaty, in twenty-one
general statutes, litigating treaty claims
would more than likely cause further
embarrassment to the Crown, as well
as incur unnecessary legal expenses for
both parties.
Instead of resisting treaty claims in
court, the minister advocated a policy
of "chiefs meeting with chiefs." The
minister of justice, supported by an "A
team" of chief executives and top offi-
cials, would meet with the principal
claimants to work out agreements for
settlement. In the case of the fisheries
claim, the four chief litigants were des-
ignated by the government as Maori
negotiators. This precluded other lead-
ers, irrespective of their mana or tribal
claims, from the fisheries negotiations.
The Tribal Congress was also pre-
cluded, thereby creating potential divi-
sion in Maori ranks.
The Maori negotiators knew the
government wanted to win electoral
favor by resolving Maori treaty claims
before the turn of the century. To this
end a global settlement was needed.
When corporate giant Carter Holt sig-
nalled the sale of its Sealord subsidiary
for Nz$375 million, the negotiators
struck a deal with the Crown. The gov-
ernment agreed to put up NZ$150 mil-
lion to finance Maori into a joint ven-
ture with Brierly Investments to
purchase Sealords. With the deal went
20 percent of the quota on all new spe-
cies. In return, Maori would make no
more commercial claims to fisheries
under the Treaty ofWaitangi. Written
into the Deed of Settlement between
iwi 'tribes' and the Crown was a clause
whereby the government would repeal
Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983
which recognized Maori fishing rights
guaranteed by the Treaty ofWaitangi.
The Sealords deal exemplified the
politics of power, pragmatism, and
political expedience. For the govern-
ment, Nz$150 million was a small price
to pay for regaining control over the
threat to national stability posed by
Maori treaty claims. When an agree-
ment in principle was reached, the
negotiators went around the tribes
seeking a mandate for what was in
effect afaitaccompli. The agreement
was characterized by one negotiator as
"the only deal in town." The issues
raised by tribes opposed to the deal
were not fully debated because of the
desire to avoid losing the opportunity
to another bidder. Instead, tribal lead-
ers were invited to the Beehive (Parlia-
ment) to sign the Deed of Settlement.
They were given an hour or so to read
the 26-page deed, understand its politi-
cal and economic implications, and
sign it on behalf of their iwi. This pro-
cedure was a complete negation of
tribal decision-making by consensus.
There were ninety-three signatures
on the Deed of Settlement. This was a
long way short of the 540 signatures on
the Treaty of Waitangi, a part of which
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the deed would supersede. For an offi-
cial document, the method of signing
was not rigorous or systematic. The
deed was between the Crown and iwi,
but the six leading signatories are des-
ignated Maori negotiators. The iwi
that they represented did not appear
beside their names. Six other signatures
appeared without iwi designations.
There were also multiple signings of
the deed by three signatories. One man
signed twice, once as a negotiator, and
once on behalf of the Tribal Congress.
This paralleled the action of Chief Te
Rauparaha, who signed the original
Treaty ofWaitangi twice. But the deed
goes one better by collecting the signa-
tures of two men three times. One
signed on behalf of his tribe, and on
behalf of two others who were not
represented. Sir Graham Latimer
signed as a Maori negotiator, president
of the Maori Council, and litigant in
the Maori fisheries claim.
Eighteen signatures were designated
plaintiffs in the fisheries claim. Others
signed on behalf of waka 'canoe confe-
derations', tribal trust boards, and
runanga 'multi-tribal councils'. Two
signatories were wrongly classified as
negotiators. There were twenty-one
illegible signatures, indicating a lack of
precision in the execution of the deed.
In other cases, the names were speci-
fied in print script beside the signa-
tures. One of the signatories identified
himself as Tuwharetoa, a tribe with no
access to the sea.
Given the flaws identified in the
deed, and minimum time for debating
it on tribal marae, it was not surprising
that thirteen tribes, including the
Moriori of the Chatham Islands, op-
posed the deed. They took out an
injunction in the High Court against it.
Justice Heron denied the injunction on
the ground that the deed cast obliga-
tions only on those who signed it. The
case went to the Appeal Court where it
was dismissed by Sir Robin Cooke,
who ruled that Parliament was free to
enact legislation on the lines envisaged
in the deed (New Zealand Herald, 4
Nov 1992).
Chair of the Tribal Congress Api-
rana Mahuika sided with the dissenting
tribes. He warned that the issue would
come back to haunt the government. It
happened sooner than expected. Six
Maori members of Parliament, two of
them on the government's side,
opposed the Sealord's Settlement Bill
when it was introduced in the house.
There was further embarrassment
when Tamati Reedy, a member of the
Tribal Congress, pleaded at the United
Nations for an investigation into viola-
tions of indigenous rights by the New
Zealand government.
RANGINUI WALKER
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New Zealand 1992. The Crown's Obliga-
tions Under the Treaty of Waitangi. Memo-
randum to the Cabinet Strategy Commit-
tee, 17 March.
NIUE
The dominance of Niue's politics by Sir
Robert Rex came to an end with his
death on 13 December 1992 after a pro-
longed illness. Leader of Government
Business prior to self-government, he
served as premier from 1974 until his
death. He had attended the first meet-
ing of the South Pacific Forum in 1971,
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as well as many other regional confer-
ences.
Tributes came from around the
Pacific, while Niueans paid their re-
spects at an all-night vigil. The state
funeral-Niue's first-was attended by
virtually the entire population of Niue,
as well as representatives from New
Zealand and Australia. A public holi-
day was observed on 18 December, and
memorial services were held at the
Town Hall in Auckland, where many
Niueans live, and in Wellington, New
Zealand's capital.
Young Vivian, who had served as
acting premier during Rex's illness,
was elected premier by the Niue As-
sembly on 22 December. The opposi-
tion declined to put up a candidate
with a general election only two
months away. The main issues, the
economy and unemployment, were
ones on which the Rex-Vivian govern-
ment had experienced setbacks. In late
November Vivian had been forced to
withdraw a tax proposal that would
have added 5 percent to the cost of all
goods and services. The bill, an im-
portant part of a package offering
lower income-tax rates as well as in-
creased pensions and child benefits,
had been presented as a further step
toward restructuring Niue's econ-
omy away from dependence on New
Zealand aid.
Difficulties had also persisted with
Niue's air services. Following the col-
lapse of arrangements with Auckland-
based Niue Airlines, the government
was compelled to charter Polynesian
Airlines (at NZ$90,OOO per flight) to fly
between Niue and Auckland. Subse-
quently Niue accepted Air Nauru's
proposal of scheduled services to New
Zealand and Fiji, with Polynesian Air-
lines providing a link to the Cook
Islands and Western Samoa (and from
there to Australia). This arrangement
faltered when Air Nauru's premiere
flights were cancelled due to a dispute
between Nauru and Fijian authorities
over air traffic rights, an impasse
which Vivian claimed had to be solved
by the Fiji and Nauru governments.
The 27 February election, which
brought the Rex era formally to an
end, saw a record number of candi-
dates (24) nominated for the six island-
wide common roll seats. Nine of the
fourteen village constituencies were
contested, including that of Premier
Vivian, who had run unopposed in the
previous election. Four candidates
competed for Sir Robert's Alofi South
seat, including the late Premier's
youngest son, John Rex.
The 91 percent voter turnout was
down slightly from I990, and the
results, particularly for the common-
roll seats, showed clear signs of disap-
pointment with government perfor-
mance. There seemed little doubt that
many Niueans desired a break with the
political past. Sir Robert's widow,
Lady Patricia Rex, once the island's
highest vote winner, lost her seat in the
2o-member Niue Assembly. Her son
John won only I3 percent of the votes
in Alofi South. Her eldest son, Robert,
narrowly retained his seat.
Others closely associated with the
outgoing government also did poorly.
Common-roll member and cabinet
minister Fisa Pihigia failed to win
reelection. Terry Chapman, secretary
to government for eighteen years and
considered by some to be a likely pre-
mier, was unable to win a seat in the
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assembly. By contrast, government
opponents polled well. Independent
O'love Tauveve Jacobsen was re-
elected, as was Sani Lakatani, the
leader of a faction separate from the
Rex "establishment." Another member
of Lakatani's Atuhau Tupuhake "The
Coming Generation" group, Poni
Kapaga, also won a common roll seat.
The poll was topped by a political
newcomer (543 votes) with a famous
name-Michael Jackson-and a
widely shared Niuean predicament. A
former public servant, Jackson had
been made redundant as a result of
budgetary pressures associated with
declining levels of New Zealand assis-
tance. When the government printing
office was privatized, Jackson lost his
job but displayed his entrepreneurial
skills by leasing the equipment and
establishing himself as the island's only
printer.
Another newcomer to the Niue
Assembly was Terry Coe, an indepen-
dent and the principal of Niue High
School. He received the third-highest
number of votes, gaining a victory
which represented a new departure for
Niue's politics. It was the first time that
a palagi 'European' had gained elective
office.
The results in the remaining four-
teen seats, one for each of Niue's vil-
lage constituencies, were also note-
worthy. Both Premier Vivian and
leadership contender Frank Lui won
reelection, while the Alofi South seat
was taken by Tukala Hekau, an old
adversary only narrowly defeated by
Robert Rex three years ago. In another
constituency, its size indicative of
Niue's depopulation in recent years,
each candidate received forty-six votes.
Following a judicial recount, which
confirmed the result, the incumbent
was defeated when the election was
decided by drawing lots.
On 12 March the assembly elected
forty-seven-year-old Lui as Niue's third
premier in three months. In 1990 he
had lost his cabinet post after failing to
oust Sir Robert from office. A member
of the assembly for twenty-seven of the
past thirty years, he defeated Vivian
11-9 on the first ballot, and immedi-
ately sought to demonstrate his com-
mitment to change by the character of
his cabinet appointments.
Although Lui and Finance Minister
Lakatani had served before, the re-
maining two positions were allocated
to newcomers. As a result Niue had its
first woman minister, Jacobsen, and in
Coe its first minister of non-Niuean
descent. One experienced former cabi-
net minister bypassed by Lui, Tama
Posimani, resigned from the assembly
in May, giving the 104 registered voters
in his village of Tuapa an opportunity
to give a verdict on the new govern-
ment's performance. By that stage the
Lui team was finding progress toward
its goals far from straightforward.
The policy of increasing local pro-
duction and employment opportunities
through private sector investment,
begun under the previous government,
was proving difficult to implement.
Record shipments of coconuts and taro
produced a glut on the market, de-
pressing prices and leading to losses by
growers, exporters, and distributors.
In Maya glove-making factory, oper-
ated by a New Zealand company,
closed down, with a loss of twenty-
three jobs. A privatized sawmill was
also experiencing difficulties. The eco-
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nomic problems were having an effect
on the government's policies and credi-
bility.
Lakitani apologized to the people
for the island's economic problems,
and acknowledged that the govern-
ment lacked the funds needed to meet
its social and economic responsibilities.
Although the previous year's budget
deficit had been reduced from US$1
million to a projected US$500,000,
public servants and old-age pensioners
could not expect to receive a promised
12-percent cost-of-living allowance
during 1993-94. In May the finance
minister admitted that further reduc-
tions in the size of the public service
were likely. During the same month
petrol prices rose by 12 percent, an
increase designed to raise funds to
replace aging power generators, pro-
vide for road maintenance, and repair
a bulk-fuel depot.
Not surprisingly Lui's first overseas
visit was to New Zealand, where he
spoke to Niueans living in Auckland
and encouraged them to return home.
Changes to New Zealand legislation
made this a more attractive option, as
Niueans returning to the island to
retire (after forty or more years in New
Zealand) were able (from I July 1993)
to receive 100 percent of their New
Zealand superannuation benefits. As
part of a ten-year plan to double Niue's
population the premier offered "come
home" incentives for returning
Niueans, including renovations to the
approximately 360 empty houses on
the island. More fancifully, Lui
appealed to New Zealand pensioners
to consider spending their winters on
Niue. Although land could not be pur-
chased, the premier noted the availabil-
ity of sixty-year leases on bungalows in
some villages.
In talks with the New Zealand
government, the premier attempted
to avert further aid cuts. New Zea-
land agreed to maintain its level of
support at NZ$7 million for 1993-94
(NZ$5 million in budgetary support,
NZ$2 million for special projects), but
a 1992-93 budgetary supplement of
NZ$500,000 was not extended for
another year.
Attempts to upgrade Niue's interna-
tional status continued. Some of these
were symbolic, others potentially more
substantive. New Zealand agreed that
the office of its representative on Niue
would become a high commission, a
rank normally reserved for an indepen-
dent state which is a member of the
Commonwealth. As anticipated by the
constitutional amendment approved in
1992, responsibility for the public ser-
vice was transferred from New Zea-
land to Niue. In their joint statement
on the New Zealand-Niue relation-
ship (Levine 1993,159-160), the two
parties emphasized that New Zea-
land's acceptance of certain defense
and foreign affairs responsibilities
did "not confer on the New Zealand
Government any rights of control,"
a point underscored with the visit
to Niue in July 1992 of the USS
Racine.
There were also some promising
economic indicators. In June, agree-
ment was reached with Fiji, allowing
Air Nauru to carry passengers from
Niue to Fiji on a weekly direct flight
aimed at boosting tourism and facili-
tating contact with Fiji-based regional
organizations. Despite uncertainties
associated with air services, the tour-
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ism and marketing board claimed that
the number of visitors was three times
greater in the first quarter of 1993 than
twelve months earlier. More dramati-
cally, the growth in revenue from tour-
ism had increased fivefold during the
period.
There were plans to transform the
government administration center into
a shopping complex, a project to be
funded by the island's Development
Finance Committee. A television and
radio studio was being built with Aus-
tralian support, permitting the island
to develop its own broadcasting facili-
ties. The first private enterprise news-
paper, the Niue Star, was launched
in 1993, backed by printer-publisher
Michael Jackson. An initiative by
a Catholic priest, Father Glover,
developed into a small, environ-
mentally friendly industry, as Niue
shipped its empty aluminum cans to
New Zealand and its bottles to West-
ern Samoa.
In Tuapa, however, the judgment on
the government's efforts was far from
favorable. The by-election saw an
experienced member of the Young
Vivian camp, Fisa Pihigia, win the
seat, capitalizing on antigovernment
sentiment stemming largely from
economic difficulties. The result
left the government in a precarious
position, its fragile one-seat majority
jeopardized by unattractive options
and significant economic con-
straints.
STEPHEN LEVINE
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TOKELAU
Moves toward self-government gath-
ered momentum during 1992-93, as
steps were taken to introduce cabinet-
style political institutions. The August
1992 general/ono, held on Atafu,
decided to establish a Council of Fai-
pule to govern Tokelau when the/ono
is not in session. While this decision
formally recognized what was already
taking place, an entirely new initiative
(adopted at the same time) saw the
establishment of a new position, Ulu-
0-Tokelau (head of Tokelau), to be
rotated annually among the three
/aipule. As Tokelau's acquisition of the
administrative and political institutions
associated with a national entity
becomes more complete, New Zealand
is expected to take formal action
assigning the powers of its administra-
tor to the Council of Faipule and the
general/ano.
Nonetheless Tokelau remained on
the United Nations' list of eighteen
dependencies whose final political sta-
tus was still to be determined. In May
the Council of Faipule stressed once
again Tokelau's desire to preserve its
close political relationship with New
Zealand. A subsequent statement sent
to the UN Committee of Twenty-Four
(on decolonization) emphasized Toke-
lau's preference for finding its own
solutions to problems of political, eco-
nomic, and social development, one
balancing responsibility for the man-
agement of its own affairs with ongo-
ing programs of support from New
Zealand.
Speaking at a UN-sponsored semi-
nar in June in Port Moresby, a New
Zealander with considerable experi-
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ence of Pacific legal and constitutional
affairs, Alison Quentin-Baxter, identi-
fied "sustained autonomy" as a new
political status applicable to Tokelau.
This model provided for "local respon-
sibility for political decision-making to
the full extent desired by the people of
the island or island group" as well as
indefinite support "from an outside
source." Although perhaps not specifi-
cally drafted with Tokelau in mind, the
broad principles involved corre-
sponded closely to political develop-
ments there.
Speaking at the same conference,
Tokelau's new administrator, New
Zealand career diplomat Lindsay Watt,
who had been appointed in February,
emphasized the distinctive partnership
between Tokelau and New Zealand.
He stressed New Zealand's willingness
to maintain ties with (and support for)
Tokelau so long as this was desired by
the people of Tokelau. He also drew
attention to Tokelau's "new political
framework in the national sense," a
theme taken up in a statement to the
seminar by Tokelau's first Ulu, Sale-
sio Lui.
The United Nations Decade of
Decolonization, with its timetable for
an end to colonialism by the year 2000,
has given New Zealand and Tokelau
more opportunities to defend, and
describe, their relationship. Watt, not-
ing that "New Zealand had governed
Tokelau with a very light hand,"
pointed out that "at no time has the
administering power established a
physical presence in Tokelau." Lui told
the gathering that "Tokelau treasures
its relationship with New Zealand"
and he expressed his appreciation for
''New Zealand's willingness to allow
Tokelau to continue the process of
development in its own way, and at its
own pace."
Encouragement for a more flexible
UN approach to decolonization out-
comes could be inferred from com-
ments from its secretary-general, who
suggested that the organization should
consider new ideas and solutions for
the very small nations remaining on its
list of non-self-governing territories.
Concerns about international percep-
tions led to a New Zealand invitation
(which was endorsed by the Council of
Faipule) for a UN Mission to come to
Tokelau during 1994 to "obtain first-
hand information" about develop-
ments there. The Tokelauan leadership
is expected to impress upon observers
the need to preserve the idea of a choice
for entities, such as Tokelau, not sub-
scribing to the view of full indepen-
dence as the only or most legitimate
goal for all states and peoples.
On Tokelau's three atolls the poli-
cies agreed to at the August 1992 fono
were consolidated. Planning for the
relocation of the Tokelau public ser-
vice, from its Apia headquarters to
Tokelau itself, moved forward. This
will involve the transfer of key func-
tions and personnel, including the
directors of all six government depart-
ments, in all likelihood two per atoll.
In mid-June the New Zealand State
Services Commissioner delegated his
powers over the Tokelau Public Service
to two Commissioners, Michael Col-
lins and a Tokelauan counterpart (not
yet appointed). This was an interim
arrangement until the establishment of
the Independent Tokelau Commission,
which will act as the employer for
Tokelau's public service. The reloca-
tion of services from Western Samoa
and the reallocation of supervisory
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authority from New Zealand continue
a step-by-step process enhancing Toke-
lau's ability to make and implement
decisions about its own affairs, sup-
ported by external assistance.
New Zealand's aid to Tokelau for
1992-93 remained at the same level as
previously, while the shared commit-
ment to the relocation of the public ser-
vice was evident in the appointment of
Bryan Lawrence, previously in the Wel-
lington office of the administrator (and
earlier in the Office of Tokelau Affairs
in Apia) as transition manager and act-
ing official secretary for a twelve-
month period. The post of official sec-
retary, held for many years by Casimilo
Perez, is being disestablished, with the
Office of Tokelau Affairs being
replaced by a smaller Apia-based liai-
son unit when the relocation to Toke-
lau takes place. An Office of the Coun-
cil of Faipule is also being set up,
located on Tokelau, with administra-
tive staff to support the faipule, pro-
vide a secretariat for the generalfono,
and assist with financial management
and budgetary planning. It is expected
that, at least at the outset, its director
will be located on the same island as
the Ulu, making for a three-year rota-
tion among Tokelau's three atoll
groups.
These changes, with those adopted
earlier, enhance the scope for control
by Tokelauans, in Tokelau, over Toke-
lauan affairs. In this respect the deci-
sions about political and administra-
tive matters complement each other.
The Council of Faipule is expected to
assume greater responsibilities with the
relocation of the public service head-
quarters to Tokelauan soil. At that
time, eachfaipule will perform ministe-
rial-type functions, with responsibili-
ties for public service "portfolios" situ-
ated on the island on which afaipule
resides. This attempt to blend a West-
minster concept of ministerial responsi-
bility with the realities of island life in a
multi-atoll context demonstrates a nec-
essary degree both of creativity and
pragmatism.
In this effort, respect for Tokelau's
traditional values remains paramount.
The fono has identified these forms of
development as consistent with what it
regards as Tokelau's strengths, "the
family, the atoll and the community."
In the administrator's view, prospects
for "establishing a viable national gov-
ernment" depend on the model of gov-
ernance "expanding the values of shar-
ing and cooperation which have their
institutional base in the villages." A
concept which empowers Tokelauans
while recognizing economic and geo-
graphic realities, symbolized by the
phrase "independence through interde-
pendence," has won broad acceptance.
Transition and change were charac-
teristics of Tokelau's January 1993 elec-
tions as well, with only one of the three
faipule (SalesioLui, of Nukunonu)
being reelected. Keli Neemia was
electedfaipule bn Fakaofo, while on
Atafu the position was won by Lepaio
Simi. Together they comprise the newly
organized Council of Faipule, with Lui
(by virtue of seniority) becoming the
first Ulu-O- Tokelau.
These election results extended ear-
lier voting trends towards a younger
and better educated leadership with
wider experience. Lui, forty-two years
old, is a teacher with a degree from the
University of the South Pacific, as is
Simi, who is in his mid-forties. The eld-
est of the three, Keli Neemia, fifty-two
(younger that the faipule he defeated),
M' 'MHMf94I&iIkM£& tp£ J t
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING 1994
was formerly a village constable and
secretary to Fakaofo's Council of
Elders.
Similar outcomes occurred in the
pulenuku elections, held immediately
following the announcement of the
jaipule results. In these elections only
one incumbent (Lui Kelekolio, on
Fakaofo) won reelection. On Nuku-
nonu the position was won by Ioane
Tumua, a teacher (and deputy princi-
pal) who was a candidate younger than
the person he defeated. On Atafu,
Amusia Patea, who had returned to the
island after living in New Zealand for
six years, was defeated as jaipuIe, but
subsequently elected pulenuku.
Some economic initiatives also took
place. Tokelau's balance of payments
was likely to benefit from increased
sales of stamps to collectors, with
anticipated revenues of around
NZ$200,OOO per year. Receipts from
fishing in 1992 were substantially over
the norm, exceeding NZ$1 million.
Development priorities continued to
focus on telecommunications and
ongoing projects, including the repair
of Tokelau's sea walls.
STEPHEN LEVINE
THE KINGDOM OF TONGA
The state and the churches once again
became embroiled during the year as
supporters sought to better define and
organize the prodemocracy movement
as a politically and socially influential
tool. The movement has been gather-
ing support over the last few years
among the better educated members of
the commoner electorate and smaller
independent entrepreneurs, especially
in Tongatapu. When it was formally
established in August 1992, the leading
positions on the committee were taken
by church people, whose increasing
support for the thrust towards greater
democracy was also apparent in out-
spoken public statements and writings.
Seluini Akau'ola, Roman Catholic
priest and pastor of the nation's capi-
tal, Nuku'alofa, became the first
chair of the committee. In his absence,
Reverend Simote Yea from the Free
Wesleyan Church has been the acting
chair.
The Convention on the Constitution
and Democracy, which had been
widely mooted for some months,
became the movement's first project
and was staged in the basilica of the
Catholic cathedral in Nuku'alofa in
November 1992. For four days,
Tongan churchpeople, scholars, educa-
tors, and others spoke to an audience
of several hundred people about issues
of social justice and political reform.
Most speakers advocated moderation,
slow growth of democratic institu-
tions, and political change through
education. In the absence of members
of the government and representatives
of the monarch, no amendments to the
constitution could be made. Thus the
convention became largely an educa-
tional exercise, with teachers and
reformers instructing the people about
peaceful change and democracy. It was
opened by active spokesperson for
reform and former head of the Free
Wesleyan Church Reverend Dr 'Ama-
naki Havea, and was closed by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of all Tonga
and Niue, Patelisio Finau, who contin-
ues to campaign strongly for greater
social justice and democracy in Tonga.
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Influential academics such as Dr Epeli
Hau'ofa, Dr 'Ana Taufe'ulungaki, Futa
Helu, and churchmen such as Dr Sione
Latukefu, Dr 'Amanaki Havea, and
Siupeli Talai spoke of the need for
change, the kinds of change desirable,
and the need for patience. Democracy
may appeal philosophically to a few,
but is poorly understood by the mass of
the electorate, and opposed by a pow-
erful social and political elite. The con-
vention helped to polarize the opposi-
tion, with the Minister of Police
denying foreigners entry to the country
to attend the convention, banning for-
eign journalists, and even threatening
to revoke the visa of an outspoken
Tongan participant traveling on an
American passport.
The constitutional convention
marked the beginning of intense prepa-
ration for the February 1993 elections.
Conservative elements, represented by
the cabinet and the nobles' representa-
tives in Parliament, attempted to divide
church support for democracy by ask-
ing church leaders to find less radical
candidates for the commoners' votes in
the election. Prime Minister Baron
Vaea called together cabinet ministers
and church leaders to discuss the for-
mation of a Christian Democratic
Party, working on the principle that if
you can't beat them, appear to join
them. But no one was fooled, and
neither move came to anything. The
conservatives finally had to return
nine noble candidates, some of
whom entered Parliament for the first
time and are, if anything, more polit-
ically conservative than their prede-
cessors.
In the prodemocracy camp, mat-
ters did not always proceed smoothly
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either. Laki Niu split publicly with
'Akilisi Pohiva over the latter's plans
to form a political party that would
consolidate the prodemocracy vote
in Parliament. Also, although Niu
wanted political reform, he believed
that Tonga should not elect its lead-
ers democratically, and opposed lead-
ers who wanted democracy at all
costs. The lack of coordination among
prodemocracy parliamentarians
meant that Pohiva and Uiliami Fuko-
fuka were the only truly outspoken
representatives of the movement in the
final sessions of the outgoing Parlia-
ment. The prodemocracy sitting
members ran as independents, and
Niu lost his seat.
Because six of the nine representa-
tives returned by the people were iden-
tified as prodemocracy candidates,
some. have seen a definite call for
change in the results of the 1993 elec-
tion. However, the results were equiv-
ocal. Despite winning 56 percent of the
overall vote, prodemocracy parliamen-
tarians have no party, no platform, and
are unlikely to vote together. Given the
degree of ambivalence and confusion
surrounding the key issues, it is diffi-
cult to estimate the movement's
strength, or to predict what its repre-
sentatives could achieve even if they
remained united. In the present system,
they are heavily outnumbered by noble
representatives and members of
cabinet.
While Pohiva and Fukofuka re-
tained their seats as representatives for
Tongatapu with overwhelming majori-
ties, the sitting prodemocracy members
in the Ha'apai and Vava'u constituen-
cies were replaced by new members
who professed to be reformist. An
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incoming member for Vava'u, who had
been in Parliament between 1966 and
1986, and was returned on a reformist
ticket, stated after the elections that
60 percent of the Vava'u electorate do
not comprehend the pros and cons of
democracy. While he was prodemo-
cracy, he would not support the in-
troduction of full democracy or party
politics to Tonga (Tonga Chronicle,
II Feb 1993, 2, 8). The dissension
against the status quo expressed in the
anonymity of the private ballot was
qualified or contradicted by opinions
for which people might be held
responsible.
The movement remained strongest
in Tongatapu. Pohiva continued to
press for the publication of confidential
information regarding government
finances and argued, with some suc-
cess, that the freedom of the press
should be protected, as stated in the
constitution. The success of some
reformist goals, however, should not
be confused with a desire for western-
style democracy. Much of the popular
support for Pohiva and Fukofuka in
Tongatapu came from rural areas. This
may be interpreted as populist support
for parliamentarians who are willing to
fight the system in ways that ordinary
people can, or dare, not. But this sup-
port can also be related to sectional
economic interests. In recent years, the
success of commercial farming in
Tongatapu, especially the export of
pumpkin squash to Japan, has aggra-
vated problems of land shortage and
insecurity of tenure which the govern-
ment has failed to address construc-
tively. Small commercial farmers have
also encountered difficulties marketing
their squash through the seven compa-
nies which have been granted export
quotas. Many of these companies are
controlled by members of the aristoc-
racy and wealthy business people. Sup-
port for Pohiva and other prodemo-
cracy parliamentarians may be one
way small farmers can protest the way
they have been treated by the compa-
nies. But this support does not neces-
sarily indicate support for broader
democratic ideals. Uncertainty about
the outcome of political reforms, or a
desire for some reform without threat-
ening the monarchy and the present
three-tiered system of rank in govern-
ment (consisting of monarch, nobles,
and the people), is perhaps why there
was a poorer voter turnout in 1993 than
in the previous two elections.
Progovernment conservatives, such
as 'Eseta Fusitu'a, deputy secretary to
the cabinet and wife of the noble
Speaker of the House, maintained that
the majority of the electorate voted
against the reformists. They inter-
preted this as a vote for the establish-
ment or, at least, as a win for both
sides and not a landslide victory for the
prodemocracy movement. Mrs Fusi-
tu'a pointed out that while the prode-
mocracy parliamentarians won all
three seats on Tongatapu, their total
vote dropped, while that of the pro-sta-
tus quo candidates increased by 50 per-
cent to capture 60 percent of the total
vote. With a voter turnout of only 59
percent overall, the results cannot be
seen as a mandate for democratic
reform. However, the government is
also clearly on the defensive. A new
government information office has
been set up, and has acquired radio
time for Mrs Fusitu'a to explain its
actions to the nation. The cabinet also
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began to reactivate local government to
improve its image and communications
with village people. The police minister
continued to speak against the prode-
mocracy supporters in his weekly col-
umn in the government-run newspaper
the Tonga Chronicle, and has even
threatened them with violence. After
the election he wrote "The continual
sly hints of corruption and dishonesty
against His Majesty's Government
without proof is going to rebound with
multiple traumatic consequences on
those concerned" (Tonga Chronicle, II
Feb 1993, 3)·
In addition, not all members of the
churches are behind their leaders' call
for political reform. People have asked
that church newspapers omit political
comment and concentrate only on the
teachings of the gospel and church
news. An advisor is to be appointed to
counsel Free Wesleyan Church mem-
bers regarding the denomination's offi-
cial stands on political and social issues
(Tonga Chronicle, 20 May 1993, 5).
The Mormon Church has never sup-
ported the prodemocratic position.
The government also points to the fact
that the Tonga National Council of
Churches did not officially participate
in the constitutional convention, be-
cause one of its four member churches
(Roman Catholic, Free Wesleyan,
Anglican, and Free Constitutional
Church of Tonga) did not wish to do
so. Members of all these churches
attended as individuals, but the council
as an entity was not represented. Other
letters to the press indicate a country
very much divided on whether to move
towards reform or to fight, literally, to
retain the present system. Many
Tongans feel that moves towards
m •
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democracy are disrespectful to the
monarch and nobles, and threaten
Tonga's heritage. The prodemocracy
supporters are equally convinced that
steps forward can be made peacefully
by a gradual education of the elector-
ate. The increasing number of non-
government controlled newssheets,
papers, and magazines launched in
Tonga play an important role in in-
creasing people's awareness of signifi-
cant issues. Several popular leaders
have emerged. But the cabinet together
with the nobles' representatives still
controls the majority in Parliament,
and the king retains the power to create
ministers of state who will support the
oligarchy. It is difficult, therefore, to
see how democratic change might
occur in the foreseeable future, except
by royal fiat which would imply an
emphatic change of royal heart. The
present situation, which is one of stale-
mate, shows that the prodemocracy
movement still has a lot of educating
to do.
KERRY JAMES
WALLIS AND FUTUNA
The major event of the period under
review was the earthquake that shook
the island of Futuna during the night of
12 March 1993. The quake, which reg-
istered 6.5 on the Richter scale, caused
the death of three people and substan-
tial damage to the island. Land and
rock slides blocked off some of the
roads, complicating the task of the
relief operations launched from Wallis
and New Caledonia. Public utilities
were heavily disrupted. Power and tele-
phone lines were restored quickly, but
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the water distribution network took
much longer to repair. By the end of
June, Futuna was still without running
water. Buildings were also severely
damaged. While traditionalfale-style
houses, which still represent a sizable
percentage of the total, withstood the
shock rather well, western-style build-
ings fared worse. Concrete structures
fractured, and dressed stone buildings
(primarily churches, chapels, and mis-
sion buildings dating back to the last
century) collapsed partially or com-
pletely. Many contemporary dwellings
are raised on short stilts, and some of
these suffered a similar fate. The initial
quake was followed by a series of sec-
ondary tremors, registering up to 4.5
on the Richter scale, which completed
the destruction of some of the already
damaged structures. The total damage
has been estimated at over U5$14 mil-
lion. During his visit to the territory in
June 1993, Minister for Overseas Terri-
tories Dominique Perben announced a
government grant of approximately
U5$4 million for the rebuilding of
Futuna. The government had already
allocated an initial U5$40,000 for
. emergency measures immediately after
the quake. One of the consequences of
the earthquake will be felt for a long
time to come: the extensive reef flats
which line the south and south west
coasts were raised by about half a
meter. At high tide, the sea no longer
reaches what used to be the shoreline.
On the political front, the period
was marked by two national elections.
On 20 September 1992, voters in Wallis
and Futuna cast their ballots in the
national referendum on the ratification
of the Maastricht Treaty on European
unity. Representative Kamilo Gata
campaigned for a yes vote, in line with
the policy of his political allies in met-
ropolitan France, Mouvement des
Radicaux de Gauche (the MRG, which
regrouped the left under the banner of
President Francyois Mitterrand, and at
the time represented the majority in the
national assembly). The yes vote was
also supported by the nonaligned presi-
dent of the Territorial Assembly, Soane
Uhila, and by the assembly's economic
and social advisor, Gaston Lutui. The
representatives of the two major par-
ties in the then opposition in metropol-
itan France, Senator Papilio Makape
(of the Rassemblement pour la Repub-
lique, or RPR) and Basile Tui, the local
leader of the Union des Franrais (UDF),
campaigned in favour of the no vote,
even though on the national scene the
UDF had endorsed the yes vote and the
RPR had given out mixed signals. Basile
Tui was concerned about the effect for
the territory of the clause in the treaty
concerning the freedom of movement
of peoples and goods, while Senator
Makape was more anxious to de-
nounce the government's actions,
which he judged negative for Wallis
and Futuna. The yes vote won the day,
with 76.54 percent of the ballots cast.
Vote participation was IOW-54.4 per-
cent-yet significantly higher than that
for New Caledonia, and much higher
than for French Polynesia.
Elections for the representative to
the French National Assembly were
held in March 1993. There were three
candidates in the first round of voting
on 21 March. Previous President of the
Territorial Assembly Clovis Logologo-
falau had been endorsed by the Union
pour la France party, an election coali-
tion between RPR and UDF. Also run-
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ning were the incumbent Kamilo Gata,
MRG party, and the nonaligned Soane
Uhila, president of the Territorial
Assembly. Kamilo Gata carried the
first round with 45.64 percent of the
vote. Clovis Logologofalau received
37.8 percent, and Soane Uhila 16.54
percent. For the second round, Soane
Uhila withdrew and endorsed Logolo-
gofalau, who also received support
from political allies in New Caledonia,
and a special campaign visit by a met-
ropolitan RPR senator. Nevertheless,
Kamilo Gata was able to keep his lead
and won the day with 52.41 percent of
the vote. The voters of Wallis and
Futuna apparently broke with estab-
lished tradition, whereby they consist-
ently voted for dominant political
groupings in metropolitan France, and
cast their ballots-with an unusually
high participation rate of 88.8 percent
of voters-on the basis of purely local
issues.
The majority coalition between MRG
and nonaligned members of the territo-
rial assembly, which had made possible
the 1992 election of the nonaligned
Soane Uhila as president, quickly
showed signs of breaking apart. In the
very first extraordinary session of the
assembly MRG representatives joined
forces with members of the RPR for the
vote on a bill concerning child welfare.
By the end of June 1993, the nine RPR
representatives had formed a coalition
with Soane Uhila's five nonaligned
members to command a majority. Rep-
resentative Kamilo Gata, who had
waged a serious battle against his for-
mer ally Soane Uhila during the
national legislative election campaign,
proposed that the presidency of the
assembly be given to the RPR group,
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but met with little support. The new
president will be elected during the
budget session, scheduled for the
fourth quarter of 1993.
The labor unrest of the previous
year continued with a series of similar
strike actions. Most of these occurred
during the second half of 1992, and
affected the offices of weather and civil
aviation, and departments of health
and education. The main complaint
continued to concern the recognition of
local career employees in the various
departments as full-fledged members of
the national French civil service.
The Catholic mission and the tradi-
tional chiefly hierarchy, the twin pillars
of Wallisian and Futunan society, came
under strong criticism from the secre-
tary-general of the major labor union
in the territory, the local chapter of the
Force Ouvriere. At the fourth conven-
tion of Force Ouvriere in Noumea, he
blamed them for the economic stagna-
tion affecting the territory, and called
for the liberation of the population
from their authority.
The gradual increase in the number
of wage earners in the population con-
tinued to alter the face of society. Sala-
ried employment grew slower overall
than in the two previous years, but
remained high (22.8 percent) in the pri-
vate sector. The shift from public to
private sectors continued. In 1992, the
private sector accounted for 42 percent
of wage earners, compared to 17 per-
cent in 1986 and 37.7 percent in 1991.
Of the 1066 public servants in the terri-
tory in 1992, 837 were locally recruited
and 229 were sent from metropolitan
France.
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The year 1992-93 was one for trade
missions and establishing sister city
relationships. One such relationship
was initiated between Maclean Shire in
New South Wales, Australia, and
Apia. Population was predicted to dou-
ble to 313,981 by the year 2021. There
were setbacks. The Washington
embassy, opened with fanfare in 1990,
and blighted by financial mismanage-
ment, was closed during the year and
its functions resumed by the New York
office.
Current and former lands and sur-
vey ministers exchanged abuse in Par-
liament over whose wife had what
store in the new market. Parliamentary
Speaker Afamasaga Fatu Vaili stepped
in and separated the two. Later, he
blew the whistle on Ulualofaiga Tala-
maivao Niko for upsetting standing
orders as the latter tried fielding a ques-
tion on the 1992-93 budget. Nine
months later, Afamasaga clashed with
Prime Minister Tofilau. With Parlia-
ment in disarray, he adjourned April's
session weeping. The prime minister
battled on. His ruling Human Right
Protection (HRPP) government had
pushed through constitutional changes
in 1991, increasing parliament's term
from three to five years, and cabinet by
four ministers. Factionalism struck
with members of Parliament threaten-
ing to withdraw support if passed over
for the cabinet. For the fifth or sixth
time, Tofilau announced his resigna-
tion and the herd laughed and
regrouped.
The churches had more than reli-
gious instruction in their minds. The
Baha'i got together women from the
two Samoas for a three-day national
conference. Coordinator Foisaga
Eteuati-Shon discussed grass-root
women and the economy, while the
University of the South Pacific's Tuala
Tiresa Malietoa stressed women, cul-
ture, and environment. Methodists dis-
cussed ways of aligning monetary poli-
cies with modern economic practices at
their annual conference in July.
Tiava'asue Falefatu Sapolu, a law-
yer in private practice, was chosen as
chief justice in July 1992. No stranger
in judicial circles, he had served as act-
ing Chief Justice, and two terms as
attorney general, in 1983-85 and 1988-
90. In 1990, he held both positions and
still managed to find time for his pri-
vate practice. Blood ties in small Island
communities run deep, particularly in
high places. Tiava'asue succeeded his
brother-in-law and acting Chief Justice
Richard B. Lussick, married to Kata-
lina Sapolu. His blood and profes-
sional ties further increased the back-
log of cases because of conflicts of
interest. In some cases, he was involved
at different times as defense counsel,
government prosecutor, and judge.
Western Samoa Trust Estates Cor-
poration, once the country's largest
primary producer, continued to strug-
gle with its bills. It was left with a six-
thousand-acre plantation in Mulifa-
nua, another twenty-five acres at Nu'u,
a soap factory and abattoir at Vailele
(Samoa Times, 18 Sept 1992). Revenue
from lease of land now reverts to the
Samoa Land Corporation, formed in
1990, which may soon demand rent
from the Trust Estates Corporation.
With cocoa production down since
1990, and full coconut production still
months away, a no-sale policy was
POLITICAL REVIEWS
imposed on livestock to build up the
herd.
Import substitution, expansion, and
diversification remained catchwords.
For 1991, combined export earnings
were ws$16.54 million. Tourism earned
WS$34 million, double that of all other
exports. On the debit side, imports of
industrial supplies cost WS$78.1 mil-
lion. Tourism was boosted with an
inaugural Teuila Festival, complete
with a New Zealand-inspired flea mar-
ket and a ten-year development plan.
Samoa's distinctive culture is on sale,
with plans to improve access to some
320 remote villages.
Greater access to customary lands
for investment purposes, especially in
promoting public infrastructure for
tourism, was planned. The idea was
that government would lease land from
customary landowners, to be subleased
to investors for commercial develop-
ment. Investors would deal with one
central authority, thus protecting land-
owner's interests and speeding up
negotiations (Samoan Observer, 4 June
1993)·
Two New Zealand-generated trust
funds dominated the headlines in
March and April 1993. The first in-
volved funds for victims of Cyclone Val
collected by Samoans in New Zealand,
and matched dollar-for-dollar by the
New Zealand government. Having
raised ws$1.8m from a telethon, the
community leaders decided to bypass
the Apia government and go straight to
the districts. But things went sour.
While the country picked up with New
Zealand assistance, the committee
embarked on a course of self-destruc-
tion (Savali, 22 April 1993).
In April, the second scandal sur-
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faced. Attorney-General Le'aupepe
Sanerive Muli'aumaseali'i resigned
when found guilty on four charges of
professional misconduct. The charges
related to trust accounts totalling more
than us$61,000 at his Auckland law
practice, which he ran from 1982-1991.
He was a ranking matai, and most of
his clients were Samoans.
Tupa'i Se Apa succeeded Le'aupepe
as attorney general. He was public
trustee for five years before setting up a
law partnership with Tuala Karanita
Enari, the country's first local and
highly respected secretary to govern-
ment in the early 1970s.
With New Zealand assistance, two
electronic beams landed in Apia during
May; a set of traffic lights and a televi-
sion station. Television Western Samoa
was launched on 29 May replete with
lotu and lauga from leaders of the two
Samoas. On 'Upolu, transmission
extends east to Lufilufi and west to
Falelatai and the eastern coastline of
Savai'i. Nestled in between, Manono
and Apolima are within easy range.
The thirty-first independence cele-
bration inaugurated an honors list with
four categories: Malietoa Tanumafili II
Service Order for outstanding acts of
bravery or heroism (made posthu-
mously to three tama'aiga associated
with decolonization); the Western
Samoa Order of Tiafau for long and
outstanding service (six awards); the
Western Samoa Order of Merit for out-
standing achievement in any field of
endeavor (nine awards); and the West-
ern Samoa Certificate of Excellence for
exceptionally high achievement in any
field of endeavor (nine awards). In
addition, three honorary awards were
made.
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The University of the South Pacific's
(usp) silver jubilee was also remem-
bered in Apia. Prime Minister Tofilau
Eti opened usp's biannual council at
the School of Agriculture on the Alafua
campus. He expressed surprise at the
small numbers of students of agricul-
ture, and urged better coordination in
agricultural research. Pro-Chancellor
and Forum Secretariat chief executive
Ieremia Tabai replied that Western
Samoa had given uSP Alafua its first
regional Vice-Chancellor (usp Bulletin,
4June 1993).
In June, Parliament was presented
with the 1993-94 budget, which pro-
jected ws$168.37 million in expendi-
tures and WS$169.61 million in reve-
nues. Finance Minister Tuilaepa
restated the debilitating effects of suc-
cessive cyclones and consequent de-
cline in GDP since 1990. The poor per-
formance of the agricultural sector in
1992 was mitigated to some extent by
that ofYazaki, automobile wiring
assembler and the country's largest
export industry. Estimated real GDP
declined by 4.6 percent in 1992, com-
pared to a decline of 7.5 percent in
1990. Import payments increased to an
all-time high of WS$271 million, while
export earnings dropped to ws$I4 mil-
lion, resulting in a balance of payments
deficit of WS$20 million for 1992, the
first since 1981. Family remittances
declined by 50 percent during the same
period. During the first quarter of
1993, net foreign assets dropped by
WS$7.5 million, reducing import cover
from eight to six months.
On a brighter note, Tuilaepa prom-
ised more privatization and a decline in
inflation from its April 1993 rate of 6.2
percent. Government investment in
social and economic infrastructure had
led to a corresponding increase in
investment as a ratio of GDP, from 26
percent in 1989 to 42 percent in 1992.
Tuilaepa predicted that, as the agricul-
tural sector recovered, and if the im-
port bill was contained, the economy
would grow by 4 percent in 1993.
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